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Crisis, Response and Distributional Impact: The Case of Ireland  
1. Introduction1 
Ireland is one of the countries most severely affected by the Great Recession. National 
income fell by more than 10 per cent between 2007 and 2012, as a result of the bursting of a 
remarkable property bubble, an exceptionally severe banking crisis, and deep fiscal 
adjustment. The crisis culminated in a bail-out being required from the EU and IMF as the 
state’s borrowing costs on the financial markets became unsustainable. Ireland’s response 
to the crisis, as part of an Economic Adjustment Programme agreed at the time of the bail-
out, is of particular interest, being widely seen as a “test case” for what is often described as 
the austerity approach. This paper focuses on the income distribution consequences of the 
crisis and of the state’s response, rather than on its merits or otherwise as a macroeconomic 
strategy: these consequences will be an important consideration in any overall assessment, 
and of relevance to other countries undergoing stagnation and fiscal ‘correction’. To analyse 
these income distribution effects, we make use of the latest available microdata, notably the 
2011 round of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC)) and the SWITCH tax-
benefit model (Callan et al., 2012) 
The macroeconomic and labour market context in which income inequality trends have 
occurred, and central features of the fiscal policy response, are summarised in Section 2. Key 
elements include a rise in unemployment from about 4 per cent to 14 per cent; sharp rises in 
taxation; reductions and restrictions on welfare payments; and progressively structured 
reductions in public sector pay. Section 3 sets out the basic results on income distribution 
over the period 2008 to 2011, during which most of the fall in average incomes occurred. 
Our exploration of changes in inequality over this period has three main elements examined 
in the succeeding sections. 
In Section 4, we consider some important issues concerning data and methods, which could 
have a bearing on the results. These include the treatment of lump-sum payments which 
became more common (especially in the public sector) due to early retirement and 
redundancy schemes. We also discuss the issue of representativeness of the survey data on 
income distribution, using the income distribution statistics as reported by the Revenue 
authorities as an external check. 
Section 5 uses decompositions of inequality by income source and by population sub-group 
to identify some factors behind the observed changes, and to guide further investigation. 
Section 6 explores how much of the total change in inequality is due to changes in tax and 
transfer policy, and how much is due to changes in market incomes – including the loss of 
                                                          
1 We are grateful to the Central Statistics Office for access to the SILC data. Thanks also to conference 
participants at IZA, Bonn and ESRI for helpful comments. The authors alone are responsible for the analysis 
and interpretation of these data.  
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income for those becoming unemployed. Finally, Section 7 sets out key conclusions and 
priorities for further analysis. 
2. Macroeconomic Context and Policy Measures 
The focus of this paper is on the impact of the Great Recession on Ireland’s income 
distribution – both directly and via the way policy has responded. In order to understand the 
context in which the recessionary forces were operating, it is necessary to keep in mind the 
broader backdrop. Over the years 1994 to 2007, economic growth in Ireland was among the 
highest in the OECD (see Figure 1 for the rise in GDP per capita). The period 1994 to 2000 
saw an annual average growth rate in real GDP of over 7%. This growth was accompanied by 
sustained increases in the numbers in employment, rising from 1.2 million in 1994 to 2.1 
million by 2007. Unemployment fell to just over 4% in 2000 and remained around this level 
until 2008 (Figure 1). Ireland had long been a country of net emigration, but this trend 
reversed as significant numbers of Irish emigrants returned and immigrants from other 
countries were attracted to Ireland. 
Figure 1 : Unemployment Rates and GDP per Capita, 1995-2011 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office 
 
Ireland’s economy entered recession in 2008, and by 2010 GDP per capita had fallen by 
more than 13 per cent, while unemployment soared to almost 14 per cent. This scale of 
economic deterioration was driven by three main factors: 
• The effects of worldwide recession on a small and very open economy, compounded 
by  
• a dramatic collapse in property prices and in activity and employment in the 
construction sector, upon which the Irish economy had become heavily reliant, and  
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• a banking crisis whereby the Irish government was required to come to the aid of 
banks which were deeply exposed by the extent of their property-related lending.  
Each of these factors contributed to a fiscal crisis, with tax revenues collapsing while 
increased unemployment led to greater demands on the welfare system. The banking crisis 
resulted in the government guaranteeing both investors and bondholders and led to 
unsustainable yields on Irish bonds as government debt grew. These unsustainable yields led 
to the Irish government seeking a financial ‘bailout’ from the EU, the ECB and the IMF in 
2010.  
The nature of the recession, and in particular the severity of the downturn for the 
construction industry, has contributed to a sharp differential in the evolution of the male 
and female unemployment rates. Figure 2 shows that the unemployment rates for men and 
women were similar, at about 4 to 5 per cent, for the years 2003 to 2007. By 2011, the male 
unemployment rate had risen by 13 percentage points, while the female unemployment 
rate had risen by about half that much. 
 
Figure 2: Male and Female Unemployment Rates, 2003 to 2011 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 
What about developments in wages for those in employment? Table 1 shows that on 
average, there has been a small rise in hourly earnings over the 2008 to 2012 period, but 
there is a great deal of diversity across sectors. Sectors are ordered in the table from those 
with the largest negative change to those with the greatest increases. There were falls of 5 
to 6 per cent in public administration and defence, and in finance and insurance; but 
increases of 7 to 8 per cent for those in industry. Wages in public sector organisations were 
reduced first by via a ‘Pension Related Deduction’ (PRD), introduced in 2009, whereby the 
first €15,000 of annual earnings were exempt, but a 5% levy was paid on the next €5,000 of 
earnings, 10% paid on earnings between €20,000 and €60,000 and 10.5% on earnings above 
€60,000. Later, in 2010, a straight pay cut for public sector workers was implemented, with a 
reduction of 5% on the first €30,000 of salary, 7.5% on the next €40,000 and 10% reduction 
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on the next €55,000. New entrants were also to be hired on salaries 10% lower than the 
level payable to current staff. The evolution of average wages in the public sector has also 
been affected by compositional shifts. For example, a policy of incentivized early retirement, 
made available to those aged over 50, may have removed from the payroll more of those 
with above average wages, thereby depressing average wages. A further complication is that 
the system of incremental pay scales means that the composition of the workforce as 
between those (typically older) at the top of their scale and those who would benefit from 
annual increments can affect the extent of observed increases in pay.  
 
Table 1: Changes in Hourly Wages by Sector, 2008 to 2012 
    % change, 2008-2012* 
Finance/insurance -4.6 
Public administration & defence -4.4 
Construction 
 
-3.6 
Health & social work -2.7 
Transport & storage -1.8 
Accommodation/food service -1.6 
Electricity/water/waste -1.0 
Arts/entertainment/recreation -0.6 
Professional/scientific/technical 0.5 
Administrative/support 1.2 
Wholesale & retail 2.4 
Education 
 
3.1 
Industry 
 
3.5 
Information/communication 4.4 
Manufacturing 
 
6.2 
Mining 
 
11.2 
   Private sector 
 
1.6 
Public sector 
 
-0.2 
All sectors   1.7 
 
As well as the cuts to public sector pay, the deterioration in the economy and in the 
government’s fiscal position led to a variety of tax and benefit changes between 2008 and 
2011. Looking first at the taxation side: 
• income tax rates were held stable but other ways of increasing the direct tax ‘take’ 
were exploited: 
o An income levy, payable on gross income (excluding social welfare payments) was 
introduced in 2009 at an initial rate of 1% on annual income up to €100,100 and 
2% on income in excess of that. These income levy rates were subsequently 
doubled, as was the Health Levy. Both levies were then replaced in 2011 by a 
“Universal Social Charge” (USC) – a new form of income tax, with exemptions for 
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annual income below €4,004 and a progressive structure above this level with 
rates of 2%, 4% and 7%.  
o The income ceiling above which no further social insurance contributions were 
payable was first raised substantially, and then abolished in 2011. 
o In 2011 the standard rate band of income tax was reduced (from an annual 
€36,400 to €32,800) as were the main tax credits.  
o A €200 per annum charge on non-principal private residences was introduced in 
2009 as was a flat-rate ‘household charge’ or property tax of €100 in 2011, both 
payable by the owner of the property. This was the precursor to a full scale value-
related property tax coming into force in mid-2013. 
o Tax relief on pension contributions was also reduced, with the annual earnings 
limit for determining maximum tax-relievable contributions down to from 
€275,239 in 2008 to €115,000 by 2011, while employee pension contributions also 
became liable for PRSI and the USC. 
• indirect taxes were increased, with a rise in the standard rate of VAT and a new carbon 
tax 
On the social welfare side, income support rates were actually increased in 2009. The Budget 
for that year was brought forward from December to October 2008, and the full scale of the 
problems was not yet evident. However, the Budgets of 2010 and 2011 then reduced the 
rates of support provided by most social welfare schemes applicable to those of working 
age, and made deeper cuts in the universal Child Benefit payment. Payments to young 
unemployed people were reduced very substantially. Rates of payment for old age pensions, 
however, have remained unchanged to date. 
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3. Income Inequality, 2008 to 2011 
We look first at overall trends in conventional measures of income inequality in Ireland over 
this turbulent crisis period. We focus, as is standard, on household income adjusted for the 
size and composition of its members – i.e. ‘equivalised’ – and on data from the main surveys 
capturing household incomes for large representative samples, carried out by the Central 
Statistics Office.2 Table 2 shows Gini coefficients for disposable income (per adult 
equivalent) for the years 2005 to 2010 derived from the SILC surveys carried out each year, 
together with the corresponding figures from the Household Budget Surveys (conducted 
only every 5 years) for 2004/5 and 2009/10. 
 
Table 2: Gini Coefficient Equivalised Disposable Income Among Persons Ireland 2005-2010 
 SILC Household Budget Survey 
2005 0.324 0.317 
2006 0.324  
2007 0.317  
2008 0.307  
2009 0.293  
2010 0.316 0.316 
2011 0.311  
Sources: SILC: Survey on Income and Living Conditions, 2011 & revised 2010 results ISSN 2009-5937 
 and www.cso.ie  
 HBS: 2004-2005 from CSO (2007) p. 19; 2009-2010 from CSO (2012) p. 29 
Notes:  The equivalence scale used here, and elsewhere unless otherwise stated, is 1 for the first 
adult, 0.66 for other adults (aged 14 or over) and 0.33 for each child (aged under 14). This is the scale 
used in the official measure of poverty in Ireland, and is close to that implied by the structure of social 
welfare payments Notes: The equivalence scale used here, and elsewhere unless otherwise stated, is 1 for the first  
Whether taking 2007 or 2008 as the end of the bubble/start of the recession, the Gini 
coefficient is very similar at that point and at the latest available date, 2011 – a slight fall 
from the 2007 level, and a slight rise from the 2008 level. Indeed, over a longer period (1994 
to 2009) which includes the strong growth of the Celtic Tiger era, Nolan et al. (2012) show 
that the Gini coefficient remains in the range 0.31 to 0.32 for almost all years. Against this 
backdrop, the fall in the Gini to 0.29 in 2009, the first year in which the full effects of the 
recession were felt, is quite striking: this is the lowest level the Gini has reached in Ireland, 
by some measure, over the years since 1980. Gini coefficients calculated from the 
Household Budget Survey remained constant between 2005 and the next time the HBS was 
undertaken in 2009/10, and are in line with the SILC findings. 
                                                          
2  The equivalence scale is the one used in Ireland’s official measures of poverty: 1 for the first adult, 0.66 for 
other adults, and 0.33 for children aged under 14. This approximates the scale used in social welfare 
payments. 
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Data on decile shares calculated from SILC and presented in Table 3 give some insights into 
how the observed changes in the Gini coefficient in that survey are arising. We see that the 
most striking changes are in the share of the top decile and bottom deciles. First we consider 
changes between 2008 and 2011. The shares of both top and bottom deciles fall by 0.5 per 
cent of income (implying, of course, a much sharper fall in average incomes of the bottom 
decile). Increases in shares are found for the 7th, 8th, and especially the 9th decile. Other 
deciles see little or no change in their share of overall income. 
Against this broad stability over the full period, there were significant shifts on a year-by-
year basis. The 2009 pattern confirms the reduction in inequality suggested by the fall in the 
Gini: in fact, the 2009 distribution Lorenz-dominates the 2008 distribution.3 By contrast, 
there is an increase in inequality (again meeting the Lorenz dominance criterion) between 
2009 and 2010. The Lorenz curves for 2008 and 2011 cross, however, meaning that these 
distributions cannot be unambiguously ranked in terms of inequality using the Lorenz 
criterion. 
 
Table 3: Decile shares of equivalised disposable income among persons, 2008-2011 
     
Change 2011  
over 2008 
Decile 2008 2009 2010 2011  
  % % % % % point 
Bottom 3.5 3.6 3.1 3.0 -0.5 
2 5.0 5.3 5.0 5.0 0.0 
3 5.9 6.1 5.9 6.0 0.1 
4 6.8 7.0 6.8 6.9 0.1 
5 8.0 8.1 7.8 7.9 -0.1 
6 9.2 9.2 9.1 9.2 0.0 
7 10.2 10.6 10.3 10.5 0.3 
8 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.4 0.2 
9 14.7 14.8 14.8 15.2 0.5 
Top 24.5 23.3 24.7 24.0 -0.5 
Source: Authors’ analysis of SILC data 2008-2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3  Lorenz dominance, in this context, means that the poorest x% have a higher share of income in 2009 than in 
2008, for any value of x 
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Table 4 shows changes in average real incomes by decile. 4 The overall fall in income was just 
under 8 per cent between 2008 and 2011, but the greatest losses were strongly 
concentrated on the bottom and top deciles. On average, the real income of the lowest 
income decile in 2011 was 18 per cent lower than in 2008, while the average income of the 
top decile was 11 per cent lower. Changes in deciles 2 to 9 were less severe, ranging 
between 4 and 7 per cent – below the average percentage loss. These results reflect the 
impact of all factors, including the recession itself, on incomes. Section 6 will show that tax, 
welfare and public sector pay changes over the 2008 to 2012 period gave rise to lower than 
average losses for the bottom decile. Thus, the larger than average losses observed here are 
not due to these policy changes; instead, the main driving factors are the direct effects of 
the recession itself. Policy changes do contribute to the larger than average losses at high 
income levels. 
 
Table 4: Average real incomes by decile of disposable income per adult equivalent, 2008 and 2011 
Decile 2008 2011 % Change from 2008 – 2011 
Bottom 8,106 6,613 -18.4 
2 11,978 11,099 -7.3 
3 14,032 13,275 -5.4 
4 15,931 15,217 -4.5 
5 18,600 17,444 -6.2 
6 21,429 20,260 -5.5 
7 24,502 23,238 -5.2 
8 28,686 27,421 -4.4 
9 34,906 33,480 -4.1 
Top 59,805 52,992 -11.4 
Total 23,258 21,449 -7.8 
Source: Authors’ analysis of SILC data 2008 and 2011. 
 
A further point to be borne in mind in interpreting these results is that  comparisons of 
corresponding deciles in different years are not comparing the incomes of the same people, 
but are instead comparing what might be termed “income positions” e.g., the incomes of 
the poorest 10% in each year. Changes in composition (e.g., more of the bottom decile being 
unemployed, or self-employed with very low incomes in the recession) can also affect  the 
observed patterns, and further research is needed to identify the contribution of such 
compositional factors. 
 
The picture of changes in the income distribution can be complemented by a brief summary 
of changes in measures of poverty (Figure 3 and Table 5) . The percentage of individuals 
                                                          
4  Nominal disposable income in 2011 is adjusted to 2008 levels using the Consumer Price Index, which fell by 
2.9 per cent between 2008 and 2011. 
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falling below 60% of median equivalised income (the Laeken indicator for “at risk of 
poverty”) fell from 2005 to 2009, rising thereafter but with a net fall overall. The elderly 
(aged 65 plus) were the main exception to this pattern, with a substantial net fall in the risk 
of poverty over the full period 2005 to 2011. 
Table 5 shows how average real incomes declined sharply over the recession. The EU’s 
“anchored” poverty measures examine poverty lines which are set in the usual way (60% of 
median income) for a base year, and then simply increased in real time. This is of particular 
interest in the present context, where real incomes in 2004 and 2011 are very close to each 
other (within about 1%). Analysis on this basis, with a poverty line anchored in 2004 – and 
then almost coinciding with the standard 2011 poverty line – shows risk of poverty on this 
anchored basis initially falling more sharply than the poverty risk based on relative income 
thresholds recalculated each year, and then rising sharply, with a net fall overall. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of Persons Below 60% of Median Relative Income Poverty Line, Ireland 2005-
2011 
 
Source: CSO SILC Reports, 2005-2011. 
 
 11 
Table 5: Measures of Income and Risk of Poverty, Ireland 2004-2011 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Income € € € € € € € € 
Mean real equivalised disposable 
income (per individual, base 2004, 
CPI deflator) 
18,773 19,286 19,929 21,130 20,962 20,998 20,125 19,003 
 
% % % % % % % % 
At risk of poverty rate (60% median 
income in each year) 19.4 18.5 17.1 16.5 14.4 14.1 14.7 16.0 
At risk of poverty rate anchored at 
2004 (60% of 2004 median income, 
in real terms) 19.4 18.0 15.7 11.5 10.4 11.0 13.2 16.1 
Consistent poverty rate 6.6 7.0 6.6 5.1 4.2 5.5 6.3 6.9 
Deprivation rate (enforced 
deprivation of 2 or more items 
from a set of 11 basic deprivation 
indicators) 
14.1 14.8 14.0 11.8 13.8 17.1 22.6 24.5 
Source: CSO Statistical Release Feb 2013- SILC 2011 and revised 2010 
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4. Methodological Issues 
We highlight here two methodological issues which could potentially have a significant 
impact on the results. The first relates to the treatment of retirement and redundancy lump 
sum payments; the second concerns the representativeness of the samples. 
Treatment of Lump-Sum Receipts 
Abramovici (2006) notes that EU-SILC variable definitions sometimes include lump-sum 
benefits explicitly, and sometimes not. He also states that since the beginning of SILC the 
treatment of lump sum has been extensively discussed, with several proposals being made 
“to adapt lump sum to the concept of standard of living”. The Irish experience in the years 
2009 and 2010 brings these issues into sharp relief. Reduction in the size of the public sector 
workforce was a major goal in the programme agreed with the Troika. One of the key 
aspects of policy towards this goal was a major programme of early retirement, under 
specially incentivised terms. This had the effect of bringing forward many public sector 
retirements, effectively telescoping them into a shorter period of time, and increasing the 
numbers receiving lump sum retirement payments. Sharp increases in unemployment also 
boosted the numbers receiving redundancy payments. Overall lump sum payments 
amounted to 0.8 per cent of total disposable income in 2008. This rose to 1.3 per cent of 
income in 2009 and peaked at 2.2 per cent of income in 2010, before returning to 1.4 per 
cent in 2011. 
Our understanding is that, where possible, SILC results across Europe include lump sum 
payments such as retirement and redundancy as part of income. This is certainly the case for 
Irish results published by the Central Statistics Office. The appropriate treatment for income 
distribution purposes is a matter of debate. For example, the Canberra Group (2012) treats 
lump sum retirement payments as capital transfers, which are excluded from the definition 
of income. Redundancy lump sums, however, appear to be included as part of income in the 
Canberra Group’s preferred treatment. 
In the absence of a clear consensus position, and given the sharply increased importance of 
lump sum payments in the Irish situation, we proceed as follows. The results reported in this 
paper analyse the data including lump-sum receipts, in line with the SILC approach and CSO 
practice. However, at a number of points we have also analysed an income construct which 
excludes both retirement lump sums and redundancy lump sums. We find that inclusion of 
these lump sums plays a role in the increase in the Gini between 2009 and 2010, raising it by 
about 0.005, but has little impact over the full period.  
Sample representativeness 
A second methodological issue is whether changes in the degree to which the SILC surveys 
represent the national situation could have had an impact on the observed increase in 
income inequality. The construction of weights for SILC in Ireland, as in most EU countries, 
tends to use demographic information. While this ensures representativeness on such 
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dimensions as age and sex, it does not guarantee that the income distribution will be well 
represented. Callan et al. (2012) show that in 2010, SILC tends to underrepresent the 
number of families with high incomes, as compared with the revenue authorities’ Income 
Distribution Statistics. The key issue here is whether such underrepresentation has increased 
or decreased – if the representation of higher income households improved between 2008 
and 2010, this could contribute to a measured increase in inequality, purely because of 
changes in the success of the sample in capturing the extent of high incomes. We have 
examined this issue more closely using the SWITCH tax benefit model, which constructs a 
distribution of gross income from SILC 2008 and 2010 on a tax-unit basis, and Revenue’s 
Income Distribution Statistics. We find no evidence to suggest that SILC, with the weights 
constructed using demographic information, has become more representative of high 
income tax units. 
 
5. Decomposing Inequality Levels and Trends 
Analyses of changes in income inequality typically make use of a number of decomposition 
methods. In this section, we consider four broad approaches: 
• First we examine how the pattern of changes in decile shares set out in the previous 
section is broken down in terms of changes in major income components.  
• We then turn to results from Shorrocks (1982a) decomposition of inequality by income 
source. This is one of the standard approaches in the literature.  
• The results from the Shorrocks income-source decomposition on the relative impact of 
taxes and benefits on income inequality contrast strongly with those obtained using 
another standard approach in the literature, based on the transition from market 
income to gross income (via the addition of benefits) and thence to disposable income 
(via the subtraction of direct taxes on income). Results based on these alternative 
measures of redistributive impact (on which the Reynolds-Smolensky index is based) 
are also reported, and the sources of the contrast are discussed.  
• A decomposition by population sub-group, differentiating between households on the 
basis of the number of earners they contain, is also reported here: this is based on the 
approach of Shorrocks (1984).  
A different question – the extent to which changes in inequality are due to changes in 
market income or in tax/transfer policy – is addressed in the following section, using an 
alternative approach. 
Before considering formal decomposition results, it is useful to examine how the pattern of 
changes in decile shares seen above is broken down in terms of the major income 
components. Table 6 shows the changes in shares of total equivalised disposable income by 
decile, and the contributions of each of the main income sources to these changes. For most 
deciles, falls in income shares due to employee income and self-employment income are 
partly offset by increases in transfers. Higher taxes are paid by those in the upper half of the 
income distribution, especially those in the 9th and 10th deciles. The top decile is exceptional 
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in that employee income contributes strongly to a sharp rise in the share of the decile in 
total income, offset by a reduction arising from lower self-employment income. 
 
Table 6: Composition of changes in decile shares of income, 2008-2011 
of which: 
Decile Change in 
share of total 
equivalised 
disposable 
income 
Employee 
income 
Self-
emp’t 
income 
Other 
direct 
Transfers Taxes 
Bottom -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 
2nd 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.3 0.0 
3rd 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.6 0.1 
4th 0.1 -1.3 -0.3 -0.1 1.5 0.2 
5th -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 0.0 0.8 -0.1 
6th 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1 1.3 0.0 
7th 0.3 0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.7 -0.4 
8th 0.2 0.7 -0.7 0.0 0.9 -0.6 
9th 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.5 -1.3 
10th -0.5 4.8 -2.9 -0.7 1.3 -3.0 
All 0.0 3.0 -4.7 -0.9 7.9 -5.2 
 
The pattern of the contribution of transfers warrants closer investigation. Much of the 
increase occurs in middle income deciles (4 to 7). The changes for lower income deciles are 
more limited. This may reflect the fact that the major change in transfers was the rise in 
unemployment compensation. Given that an annual income concept is used, such transfers 
will often be received by individuals with some employment income for part of the year. 
Households containing these individuals are less likely to be in the lowest income deciles, 
compared with those depending wholly on social security payments. Furthermore, there 
may now be greater numbers of self-employed in the bottom decile, and they would have 
limited entitlements to benefits: this is a matter for further investigation. The contribution of 
transfer payments to the rise in the income share of the top decile is unusual, and arises in 
part from the inclusion of retirement and redundancy lump sum payments, as these can 
boost income to levels which bring the recipients into the top decile. 
We now turn to results based on the Shorrocks (1982a) decomposition of inequality by 
income source.5 Table 7 shows that in 2008, the share of inequality accounted for by 
employee income was 63 per cent, while the share of self-employed income was 48 per 
cent. Tax and social insurance contributions had an equalising impact which increased over 
                                                          
5  This has been implemented in Stata by Jenkins (2009). 
 15 
time. In 2011, the disequalising impact of employee income was much greater – but there 
was a fall in the disequalising impact of self-employed income.  
 
 
Table 7: Decomposition of Income Inequality by Income Source 
 
Employee 
income 
Tax on income 
and social 
contributions 
Self-
Employed 
Income 
Private 
Pensions Benefits 
Other 
Income Total 
2008 63.3 -30.7 48.2 0.5 1.0 17.7 100.0 
2009 94.2 -41.0 28.1 1.5 8.6 8.6 100.0 
2010 90.5 -51.3 36.0 3.0 14.6 7.2 100.0 
2011 114.6 -53.3 19.6 0.6 7.4 11.0 100.0 
 
The disequalising impact of benefits in 2010 arises from the lump-sum payments (pensions 
and redundancy) referred to earlier. When these are excluded, benefits had a small 
equalising impact – but far less so than taxes. This result contrasts strongly with the findings 
of what Fuest et al. (2010) term the “standard approach”: an examination of how inequality 
indices change in moving from market income to gross income (via the addition of benefits) 
and then to disposable income (with the deduction of taxes and social insurance 
contributions).  
Table 8 shows how decile shares and summary inequality indices change through these 
“stages of redistribution”. These results suggest that both benefits and taxes play a strong 
role in the reduction of inequality. Market incomes collapsed for the bottom 3 deciles, their 
share of market income falling from just under 3 per cent to 0.5 per cent. This was 
moderated by transfers, where the fall in share was about 1 percentage point. When taxes 
are also taken into account the share fell by 0.5 percentage points. The share of top income 
deciles in market incomes rose, but again this was moderated both by benefits and taxes. 
 
Table 8: Income inequality measures for Market, Gross and Disposable Incomes, 2008 to 2011 
 
Market Gross Disposable 
Decile 2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 
Bottom 0.0 0.0 3.0 2.5 3.5 3.0 
2 0.4 0.0 4.4 4.1 5.0 5.0 
3 2.5 0.5 5.2 5.0 5.9 6.0 
4 4.5 2.8 6.2 5.8 6.8 6.9 
5 6.8 5.2 7.2 6.9 8.0 7.9 
6 9.0 7.9 8.7 8.3 9.2 9.2 
7 11.2 11.3 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.5 
8 13.9 15.0 12.5 12.5 12.2 12.4 
9 18.3 20.5 15.3 16.1 14.7 15.2 
Top 33.5 36.8 27.6 28.6 24.5 24.0 
 
      
Gini 0.519 0.586 0.357 0.380 0.309 0.311 
Theil 0.344 0.371 0.233 0.249 0.178 0.165 
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The Reynolds-Smolensky indices of redistribution by taxes and benefits (Table 9)  help to 
summarise these findings. They suggest that the impact of the transfer system is about 3 
times larger than that of the tax system.  
Table 9: Reynolds-Smolensky Indices of Redistribution, 2008-2011 
Reynolds-Smolensky indices 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Transfer system 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.21 
Tax system 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Taxes and transfers 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.28 
 
Paul (2004) points to the major reason why the Shorrocks (1982a) factor source 
decomposition attributes a lower role for benefits in reducing inequality. One of the axioms 
underlying the decomposition is that “a given income source makes no contribution to 
aggregate inequality if every household receives equal income from that source”. Paul 
argues that this requirement is at odds with the idea that “if each household receives a 
constant positive income from a source, then the aggregate inequality declines”. 
Fuest et al. (2010) expand on this, in the context of a strong contrast between the 
“standard” approach and the Shorrocks factor decomposition across all 27 EU countries. 
They note that within the standard approach “equally distributed transfers imply an 
inequality reduction. In the decomposition approach, such transfers have a zero inequality 
contribution because their correlation with disposable income is zero. Therefore, these two 
different normative foundations of the two approaches are to some extent responsible for 
the differing results”. 
Table 10: Decomposition by Population Sub-Group - number of earners in household 
Number of Earners in 
Household 
Population share 
Mean Income 
(€'000 per year) 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 
0 17% 21% 25% 25% 14.4 14.3 14.0 13.5 
1 29% 33% 36% 33% 22.4 21.0 19.9 19.5 
2 36% 33% 31% 34% 28.0 29.5 29.2 28.3 
3+ 18% 13% 9% 8% 25.9 28.5 29.2 25.5 
 
Income share Gini 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2008 2009 2010 2011 
0 11% 13% 16% 16% 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.27 
1 28% 30% 32% 30% 0.34 0.27 0.29 0.28 
2 43% 42% 41% 45% 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.27 
3+ 19% 15% 12% 10% 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 
All households 
    
0.31 0.29 0.32 0.31 
         
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
    Within-Group 
Inequality 0.25 0.16 0.21 0.17 
    Between Group 
Inequality 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04         
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Table 10 decomposes contributions to total inequality by the number of earners per 
household. The proportion of households with no earner rises sharply between 2008 and 
2010, from 17 per cent to 25 per cent. The balance between within-group inequality and 
between-group inequality also changes. Within-group inequality falls, but between-group 
inequality (based on number of earners) rises. Mean incomes rise for households with 2 or 
more earners, but fall for those with no earner or one earner. 
To what extent are these results driven by changes in the earnings distribution? We examine 
this issue using the distribution of employee income for those who are employed for the full 
year, and are not therefore affected by unemployment. Table 11 shows the distribution of 
employee income for those individuals who worked for the full 52 weeks in the year. Overall, 
the inequality levels in employee income for those who worked for the full year remain 
stable from 2008 to 2011, whether measured by the Gini or the Theil Index. There were, 
however, some significant changes in decile shares, particularly in the top half of this 
earnings distribution (shares for the bottom 5 deciles were constant or fell marginally). 
Deciles 6 to 9 all experienced increases in the share of employee income, while the share of 
the top decile fell more sharply.  
Table 11: Decile Share and Inequality Measures –Individual Employee Incomes of those in full-year 
employment  
Decile 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Change 2008-
2011 
Bottom 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 -0.1 
2 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.0 -0.1 
3 4.3 4.5 4.5 4.2 -0.1 
4 5.6 5.9 5.7 5.6 0.0 
5 7.0 7.4 7.0 7.0 0.0 
6 8.4 8.5 8.7 8.8 0.4 
7 10.3 10.5 10.2 10.9 0.6 
8 12.8 12.9 12.9 13.3 0.5 
9 16.7 16.7 16.9 16.8 0.2 
Top 30.3 28.7 29.4 29.0 -1.3 
      Gini 0.421 0.404 0.414 0.417 0.00 
Theil 0.305 0.280 0.296 0.297 -0.01 
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6. The Role of Taxes, Transfers and Public Sector Pay Policies 
There is strong interest in many countries in assessing the distributional impact of austerity 
measures. Traditional decomposition methods focus on changes between observed 
outcomes in a base year, with its associated tax/transfer policy, and an end-year, with its 
associated policy. Such approaches may, for example, identify an increase in social 
assistance income, but cannot say if this arises from increased generosity of benefit 
payments or from an automatic increase in the incidence of transfers as unemployment 
rises. Bargain and Callan (2010) propose a decomposition which has particular advantages in 
addressing such questions. The decomposition partitions the total change into a part which 
reflects changes in policy, and all other sources of change. A counterfactual policy designed 
to be distributionally neutral plays a key role: this is simply the base year policy, indexed by 
the growth or decline in a broad measure of income.6 The impact of policy change is then 
measured by estimating inequality measures under this counterfactual “distributionally 
neutral” policy and under actual policy, as simulated using a tax benefit model. Where 
possible this is done for both base year and end year data: the average of the two can be 
interpreted as a Shapley value decomposition. 
Work along these lines is currently under way (Bargain et al., 2013). Figure 4 gives a broader 
picture of the impact of policy over the full 2008 to 2013 period. Here the analysis is based 
on 2010 data, and on a “distributionally neutral” policy which indexes 2008 policy in line 
with a fall (0.7 per cent) in average weekly earnings over the period. The analysis includes 
the main changes in income tax, social insurance contributions and the introduction of 
income levies as well as changes in benefit payment rates. In addition, the modelling 
includes the impact of three rounds of reductions in public sector pay, which were 
progressively structured.7 
 
Over  the full 2008 to 2013 period, the largest percentage losses of equivalised disposable 
income were in the top two deciles (11 and 12 per cent for deciles 9 and 10 respectively)., 
The lowest losses  were in the 2nd and 3rd deciles (6 and 7 per cent). A key factor in the lower 
losses for deciles 2 and 3 is that payment rates for pensioners were held constant, while 
there were explicit cuts in payment rates for those of working age, and deeper cuts in Child 
Benefit. The bottom decile, however, lost over 8 per cent of equivalised disposable income. 
This loss is similar to the losses in the 4th to 8th deciles, in the middle of the income 
distribution. 
                                                          
6  When data for base year and end year are available, the change in gross income provides a natural indexing 
factor; where income growth must be based on forward looking estimates, changes in weekly earnings are 
often used. 
7 The first round of reductions was labelled a “Pension Related Deduction”; the other two rounds 
were explicit cuts to pay. 
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Figure 4: Impact of Income Tax, Welfare and Public Sector Pay Policy Changes, 2008-2013 - 
percentage change by decile of equivalised disposable income 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
Summary measures of inequality have been broadly stable in Ireland over a long period, 
from the early 1990s through to the start of the current recession. There were, however, 
some significant shifts on a year-by-year basis in the years 2008 to 2011, during which 
average incomes fell sharply as Ireland experienced the full force of a major recession. The 
year by year pattern shows a fall in inequality in 2009, reversed in the following years. Some 
of this is directly attributable to the timing of policy changes, with an increase in welfare 
payments in 2009, while taxes and levies were sharply increased. Later years saw more 
emphasis on expenditure cuts, and less on income-based taxes. Over the full period 2008 to 
2011 the major changes have involved losses for both bottom and top deciles, with gains in 
income shares focused on the rest of the upper half of the distribution. 
Decomposition analyses find that employment income acted to increase inequality, while 
changes in self-employment income partially offset this. The large rise in unemployment was 
a major factor in increasing concentration of employment income, but there was also an 
increase in employment income in the top decile relative to others. This was partly offset by 
falls in self-employment income for the top decile. 
What of the impact of policy changes in the areas of direct tax, welfare and public sector 
pay? The SWITCH model permits analysis of this issue to be extended to cover the 2008 to 
2013 period, and finds that policy changes tended to reduce incomes by more than average 
for the top two deciles, and by less than average for other deciles. The pattern of losses in 
the bottom half of the distribution reflected the fact that payment rates for benefits to 
those of working age were reduced over the period, whereas payment rates for pension 
benefits were increased in 2009 and then held constant. Thus, losses were lowest in the 2nd 
and 3rd deciles, which contained higher proportions of pensioners than other deciles. 
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